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 1 
A Dish Served Cold: Targeting Revenge in Revenge Pornography 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The introduction of Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, 
criminalising the disclosure of private sexual images, has been seen as a welcome 
step forward for curbing this abuse of privacy and the harmful effects it has 
on victims. However, while Section 33 sidesteps any reference to ‘revenge 
pornography’, as the phenomenon has been termed in popular vernacular, little 
attention has been paid to the way in which narratives of revenge implicitly 
underpin and imbue the new offence, particularly its specific intent requirement. 
We argue this has serious implications for the treatment of Section 33 offences in 
the courts and for sentencing. Drawing on cross-disciplinary conceptualisations of 
revenge, its recent criminal-legal history, and examples of media and 
parliamentary rhetoric, we claim that despite innumerable attempts to turn debate 
on disclosure of private sexual images towards consent, harm and privacy, there 
lurks within these discourses an assumption that the victim must have done 
something to deserve the treatment she received. Until the multiple harms of 
disclosure of private sexual images are recognised and explicit recommendations 
are made that scrutiny of victims’ behaviour should normally be inadmissible, we 
argue that the offence offers little in the way of redress. 
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Introduction  
In 2015, Section 33(1) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 made it an 
offence to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made: 
 
(a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or 
film, and 
(b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the new offence in terms of scope and reach 
have been well documented. Gillespie is particularly critical of the specific mens 
rea requirement that a perpetrator’s object is to cause distress,1 while McGlynn 
and Rackley, and Henry and Powell have argued that the focus on ‘revenge 
pornography’ fails to take into account other forms of ‘image-based sexual abuse.2 
Citron and Franks have also outlined in some detail potential justifications for 
criminal-legal intervention,
3
 and the definition of ‘pornography’ in the context of 
revenge pornography has been contested.
4
 However, little attention has yet been 
paid to the specifics of why the offence in England and Wales is narrow. Despite 
the fact that Section 33 makes no explicit mention of revenge, our contention is 
that socio-cultural scripts of revenge nevertheless underpin the debates that 
shaped the offence, and will inform the treatment of the offence in the courts. By 
                                                        
1
 A Gillespie ‘“Trust Me, It’s Only for Me”: Revenge Porn’ and the Criminal Law’ (2015) Crim L 
Rev 866. 
2
 C McGlynn and E Rackley ‘Image-Based Sexual Abuse’ (2017) Oxford J Legal Stud DOI: 
10.1093/ojls/gqw033; N Henry and A Powell ‘Sexual Violence in the Digital Age: The Scope and 
Limits of Criminal Law’ (2016) 25 Soc and Legal Stud 397. 
3
 D K Citron and M A Franks ‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest L Rev 345. 
4
 Henry and Powell, above, n 2. 
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engaging with the meanings attributed to revenge and its recent criminal-legal 
history, we address the question of why it is that revenge pornography above other 
forms of technology-facilitated sexual violence
5
 has so fervently captured the 
popular imagination, proven such effective tabloid fodder, and elicited more 
commentary, debate, and campaigning for criminalisation than other forms of 
gendered violence in recent years.
6
 We will argue that despite many attempts to 
turn the debate on revenge pornography towards consent, harm and privacy, it is 
the revenge narrative that proves to be the principal rhetoric that underpins 
justifications for criminalisation, the focus in calls for early reform of the law and 
sentencing guidelines, and the mainstay of media reporting.
7
  
The origins of the term revenge pornography can be traced back to media 
stories concerning Hunter Moore and the infamous ‘isanyoneup’ website. Hunter 
Moore became one of the first individuals prosecuted for the sharing of private 
sexual images without consent.
 
While the offence for which Hunter Moore was 
eventually imprisoned amounted to identity theft
8
 and unauthorised access to a 
computer, the term ‘revenge pornography’, which emerged in his case, remained 
and has shaped media coverage since. In England and Wales one of the first 
widely publicised instances of revenge pornography concerned Tulisa 
                                                        
5
 N Henry and A Powell ‘Embodied Harms: Gender, Shame, and Technology-Facilitated Sexual 
Violence’ (2015) 21 Violence Against Women 758.  
6
 The long-standing but comparatively underreported phenomenon of up-skirting, for example, has 
until recently been superseded – indeed eclipsed entirely – in the wake of the ‘discovery’ of 
revenge pornography. Over the last few months, a campaign was launched to target up-skirting in 
England and Wales via an amendment to S 67 Sexual Offences Act 2003, and it was raised for the 
first time in oral questions in the House of Commons on 5
th
 September 2017 (HC Deb, 5 
September 2017, vol 628, col 12). However, no legislative action has yet been taken. 
7
 While there are, of course, other ‘backstories’ that underpin the new offence, such as 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking, these are rarely foregrounded in either parliamentary debate on 
the construction of the offence or its reform, or in media reporting on the case law. 
8
 ‘Revenge porn website operator Hunter Moore sentenced to 30 months in prison’, The Verge (3 
October 2015), see http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/3/9843038/hunter-moore-revenge-porn-is-
anyone-up-prison-sentence (accessed 3 November 2017). 
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Contostavlos (previously of N-Dubz fame). The incident predated the introduction 
of Section 33, instead utilising civil litigation. However, the facts of the case are 
illustrative of most revenge porn cases; Tulisa’s ex-boyfriend posted the images 
following the breakup of their relationship mirroring many reported cases of 
revenge pornography. Thus, ‘revenge pornography’ may be a media constructed 
term, but we argue that it is this particular narrative, and set of gendered 
characterisations, that became the paradigmatic story around which the legality of 
disclosure of private sexual images was debated.  
The paradigmatic story of the revenge pornography scenario is thus as 
follows: a woman shares with her partner erotic images of herself, or permits 
those pictures to be taken. She then leaves her partner. Said ex-partner goes on to 
share these intimate and often explicit images, taken with consent, either on social 
media platforms or on specifically targeted revenge pornography websites, such as 
MyEx.com, and the now-defunct IsAnyoneUp, without consent. The image is 
sometimes discovered at this point, or worse, as a result of dissemination to other 
websites. In many cases, victims have reported harassment and stalking, the 
circulation of their private addresses and contact details online, and often retreat 
from public spaces on and offline as a result of this assault on their privacy, in 
addition to experiencing considerable distress.
9
  
There is also a parallel debate surrounding revenge motives in the context 
of ‘crimes of passion’, usually violence against women, and usually perpetrated 
by intimate partners when a relationship ends, or where there is suspicion of 
                                                        
9
 For case studies, see Citron and Franks, above n 3; M Salter and T Crofts  'Responding to 
Revenge Porn: Challenges to Online Legal Impunity' in L Cormella and S Tarrant (eds) New Views 
on Pornography: Sexuality, Politics, and the Law (Praeger Press, Santa Barbara, CA: 2015) pp 
233-256. 
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adultery. As Howe has documented,
10
 revenge as gender-based violence has 
previously emerged most frequently in cases of spousal homicide.
11
 Like Howe, 
we adopt the term ‘crime of passion’ to describe not merely an act of violence that 
takes place without premeditation, but to denote the context in which it takes 
place, and how this frames the way in which it is viewed as unpremeditated: 
romantic intimacy. We view revenge pornography, then, as a contemporary means 
of orchestrating ‘crimes of passion’, in which new technologies are weaponised 
against deviation from romantic virtue, usually against women. While there has 
been controversy over the term ‘pornography’ being attached to these images,12 
we argue that the phenomenon represents the shaping of an explicit image to the 
terms of the pornographic specifically to exact revenge on the party depicted, and 
thus use the term ‘revenge pornography’ throughout this piece. Within the 
relevant sections discussing the offence the phrase ‘disclosure of private sexual 
images’ is used to distinguish the letter of the law from popular parlance. 
We begin by examining attempts to conceptualise revenge to better 
understand what is at stake in the debates about the need for the offence, and the 
way in which it is being operationalized, and then provide a legal backdrop that 
outlines the debates surrounding the introduction of the new offence. We then 
trace how revenge has been treated historically in English criminal law, 
specifically in the context of ‘crimes of passion’. We argue that the legal response 
to ‘crimes of passion’ has crucial implications for revenge pornography cases, and 
                                                        
10
 A Howe ‘Provoking Polemic – Provoked Killings and the Ethical Paradoxes of the Postmodern 
Feminist Condition’ (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Stud 39; A Howe ‘“Red Mist” Homicide: Sexual 
Infidelity and the English Law of Murder (Glossing Titus Andronicus)’ (2013) 33 LS 407. 
11
 See, for example, R v Clinton, Parker and Evans [2012] Crim 2. 
12
 Henry and Powell, above n 2. 
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that both seemingly individualise violence against women, reimagining that 
violence as an act of revenge with justificatory or excusatory qualities that limit 
wrongfulness. This leads to a discussion about our concerns that revenge may be 
construed implicitly as the underlying rationale for Section 33’s requirement of 
specific intent. Specifically, without the prosecution team’s provision of a 
backstory, where the actions of the victim and what she did to ‘deserve’ the 
actions of the perpetrator are called into question, we suggest that a finding of 
intention to cause distress is likely to be difficult. Finally, we argue that the terms 
of the original debates over criminalisation in Parliament and subsequent attempts 
to reform the offence, and current sentencing guidelines, are also reliant on 
revenge motives to determine the shape of the offence and the terms of sentence. 
Ultimately, we argue that the offence will remain limited until there is closer 
attention paid to the harms revenge pornography may cause, and debate is 
refocused on the broader implications of ‘disclosing private sexual photographs 
and films with intent to cause distress’, rather than the paradigmatic narrative that 
accompanies discussions of ‘revenge pornography’, and make some practical 
recommendations for reform.  
 
Conceptualising Revenge  
 While doubt has been cast over the extent to which revenge pornography 
can legitimately be considered a ‘new’ phenomenon, 13  narratives of revenge, 
which proved particularly persuasive in arguments for criminalisation within 
media rhetoric and Parliament, are by no means new. As we have noted, Section 
                                                        
13
 S H Scheller ‘A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: The Legal Implications of Revenge Porn’ 
(2014) 93 North Carolina L Rev 551. 
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33 does not itself hinge on revenge as a form of specific intent. Nevertheless, the 
disclosure of private sexual imagery has continually been constructed in popular 
discourse as an act of revenge in response to the actions of the victim prior to the 
disclosure of the image. Calls for criminalisation were often reliant on this 
narrative to make a persuasive case for new legislation.
14
 The need to understand 
why someone might intend to cause distress through disclosure of sexual images 
has bled through into official discourses that do have a purchase on reform of 
the law and sentencing. With this in mind, it is important to consider precisely 
what are meant by revenge motivations, and what this can tell us about the 
potential problems with hinging the offence on specific intent to cause distress.  
In punishment theory, most retributivists steer well clear of revenge, and 
tend to assert that it has no role to play in contemporary criminal law.
15
 
Nevertheless, historically, revenge has often been positioned as precisely the 
target of retributive justice. Histories of revenge tend to take one of two 
trajectories. On the one hand, legal historians argue that the cyclical terror of 
blood revenge died naturally as law evolved, replacing a thirst for vengeance first 
with compensatory ‘pounds of flesh’, and then the rule of law.16 In this account, 
                                                        
14
 See for example, M A Franks and D Citron, ‘It’s simple: Criminalise revenge porn, or let men 
punish women they don’t like’ The Guardian 17 April 2014, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/17/revenge-porn-must-be-criminalized-
laws (accessed 1 March 2018). 
15
 For perhaps the most well-known attempt to distinguish revenge and retribution, see R Nozick 
Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). More recently, 
scholars such as G Fletcher (Rethinking Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000)) and Moore (Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997)) have provided further justification for distinguishing the two concepts. However, see T 
Rosenbaum’s Payback: The Case for Revenge (London: University of Chicago Press, 2013) for a 
defence of revenge as an operative principle in the criminal justice system and indeed, drawing on 
the example of ‘crimes of passion’, an argument that it already plays a significant role. 
16
 This perspective emerged in 19
th
 century legal historical works. See, for example, F Pollock and 
F W Maitland History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2nd edition, Liberty Fund Inc, 
2009).  
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revenge is positioned as a culturally and historically primitive response to feeling 
that one has been wronged, which eventually suffered from ‘obsolescence and 
inadaptability’.17 An anathema to the development of the rule of law, to succumb 
to vengeful urges in the present is suggestive of a human regressiveness that must 
be quashed at all costs.  
On the other hand, contractarian political theorists argue that it is not so 
simple as revenge ‘dying out’ with the miraculous evolution of human progress; 
rather, the urge for revenge exists just as it always did, but must be consciously, 
continually defeated, suppressed and punished by more measured forms of state-
sanctioned retribution.
 18
  Furthermore, this function of law is deemed necessary 
precisely to ‘contain and metabolize’19 the revenge impulse at a socio-cultural 
level. Schoenfield’s essay on the necessity of retribution in law suggests that if 
people lose faith in law’s ability to deliver justice, they will be drawn into 
escalating patterns of personal revenge.
20
 Thus, the law is seen in this more 
utilitarian purview as not merely punishing vengeful acts, but actively preventing 
them by allowing such impulses to be satisfied vicariously. The distinction 
between retribution and revenge, and the role of revenge in the criminal justice 
system, is not the substance of this article, but legal theorists who promote the 
                                                        
17
 W Miller ‘Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s Theory of Revenge’ in A Sarat and T 
Kearns (eds) Law in the Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998) 
p 161.  
18
 This perspective originates with T Hobbes The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. Part I: 
Human Nature; Part II: De Corpore Politico with Three Lives: Human Nature Pt. 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
19
 I C Rosen ‘Revenge—the Hate That Dare Not Speak Its Name: A Psychoanalytic Perspective’ 
(2007) 55 J of the American Psych Ass 595 at 607. 
20
 C G Schoenfeld ‘In defense of retribution in the law’ (1966) 35 Psych Quart 108. 
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idea of a distinction
21
 tend to argue that the achievement of vengeance – once 
moved into the hands of the state – is justifiable and ‘healthy’, while when the 
‘law’ is taken into one’s own hands it is not.  
In a recent overview of the psychological literature on revenge, Grobbink 
et al argue for a more balanced account of revenge, suggesting that a distinction 
cannot be made between ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’ revenge in clinical practice, 
and that its constitution and function are entirely reliant on the coping style and 
personality of the avenger.
22
 In this literature, revenge is considered a ‘pursuit’, 
which develops as a result of strain
23
 and the distortion of self-image of the 
grandiose self. While we adopt a certain cynicism about the extent to which 
revenge thrives simply as a matter of cognitive distortions entirely divorced from 
cultural context, the implication here is that a vicarious enjoyment of revenge, 
when criminal justice produces a satisfactory result, is regarded as ‘healthy’, and 
thus has a utility. Indeed, Frijda suggests that society should not deny or condemn 
the desire for revenge, since the pursuit itself may – when taken ‘healthily’ – 
restore psychological balance.
24
 In this vein, Posner posits that, in the past, people 
endowed with an instinct to retaliate would have tended to be more successful in 
struggles for survival and the urge for revenge survives as an evolutionary 
‘supplement’ to law enforcement.25  In other words, in this model revenge is still 
very much alive, and considered a ‘natural’ and universal urge that the criminal 
                                                        
21
 See, for example, L Zaibert ‘Punishment and Revenge’ (2006) 25 L and Phil 81; Nozick, above 
n 15. 
22
 L H Grobbink J J L Derksen and H J C van Marle, ‘Revenge: An Analysis of Its Psychological 
Underpinnings’ (2015) 59 Int J of Offender Therapy and Comparative Crim 892. 
23
 R Agnew ‘Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency’ (1992) 30 
Criminology 47. 
24
 N H Frijda The Laws of Emotion (Hove: Routledge, 2007). 
25
 R A Posner Law and Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 3rd edition, 2009) 
p 79. 
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law has a role to play in mitigating through ‘measured’ means. Due process, as 
Sarat remarks, has the power to ‘discipline passion’.26  
We might also locate psychoanalytic explanations for vengeance in this 
second history of revenge’s relationship with the law, where it is argued that 
revenge is envisioned as an ahistorical, asocial and narcissistic
27
 will-to-power 
that must be repeatedly defeated by recourse to the rational authority of the state 
and its ability to suppress it. As Beattie puts it, ‘[t]he high-octane jet fuel of 
revenge is narcissistic rage, occasioned by humiliating attacks on the grandiose 
self with its idealized self-object, which result in a primitive drive for control 
and omnipotence through revenge’.28 All id and no superego, here revenge is 
considered a symptom of pathological narcissism,
29
 where the avenger is 
seeking to eliminate an uncomfortable or painful emotion by restoring 
equilibrium.  
To date, what is missing from either psychological accounts of revenge 
or legal scholarship on the vengeful properties of criminal law, however, is any 
sense of the gendered or erotic dimensions of revenge, or how the context of 
intimate relationships shapes its constitution and method. Durkheim suggests 
that the urge to punish is itself a ‘passionate reaction’ 30  to the violation of 
socially constructed rules, and we are interested here in unearthing how the 
                                                        
26
 A Sarat When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition (Princeton, NK: 
Princeton University Press, 2001) p 39. 
27
 See, for example, H J Beattie ‘Revenge’ (2005) 53 J of the American Psych Ass 513; H Kohut, 
‘Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage’ (1972) 27 The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 
360. 
28
 Beattie, above n 27, at 515. 
29
 On narcissism and revenge, see also R P Brown ‘Vengeance Is Mine: Narcissism, Vengeance, 
and the Tendency to Forgive’ (2004) 38 Journal of Research in Personality 576.  
30
 E Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 
2013), p 85. 
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criminal law attempts to grapple with the violation of the ‘rules of civility’ that 
accompany the breakdown of a romantic relationship, and in particular the ways 
in which it draws on gendered narratives of revenge.  
A supposedly psychical drive for revenge is also not sufficient to explain 
the legal valorization of gendered revenge in the context of heteronormative 
romantic scripts, nor its consistent cultural-historical popularity. No matter 
which history or understanding of revenge one follows, Miller contends that it 
continues to operate for most of us on the periphery of our consciousness,
31
 
occasionally aroused and quickly suppressed. Indeed, our culture often seems 
deeply conflicted about the moral status of revenge. While revenge is generally 
thought to be antithetical to law and the values of Western societies, it 
nevertheless retains its appeal as a ‘pervasive theme in the movies [we] pay to 
see, TV [we] watch and novels [we] read.
32
 Thus, perhaps it is short-sighted to 
suggest that a narcissistic sense of injury is driven purely by narcissistic rage. In 
some cultures revenge is in fact a common and sometimes obligatory social 
norm, often in the context of adultery. Rather, if there is a collective cultural 
sense that certain personal slights require avenging, ‘injecting disorder into 
order and ordering the internal disorder’,33 then the social and legal scripts that 
determine ‘duty’, ‘law’ and ‘justice’ at the termination of romantic relationships, 
often resulting in ‘crimes of passion’, must be further examined to understand 
revenge pornography, and how these scripts have influenced popular and official 
                                                        
31
 Miller, above n 17. 
32
 A Sarat and T Kearns ‘The Cultural Lives of Law’ in A Sarat and T Kearns (eds), Law in the 
Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 1998) p 17. 
33
 Y Neuman ‘On Revenge’ (2012) 17 Psychoanalysis, Culture & Soc'y 1. 
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discourse on how disclosure of private sexual photographs should be dealt with 
through criminal law.  
 
The Legal Backdrop 
  Section 33 emerged as an addition to a plethora of existing laws targeting 
technologically assisted or enabled sexual offending.
34
 The new offence does not 
criminalise all private sexual images disclosed without consent as it bites only if 
their distribution is intended to cause distress to the victim, providing a barrier to 
prosecutions against those who indirectly redistribute the images through social 
media or email.
35
 Whilst this approach to mens rea has not been followed 
internationally,
36
 to date the legal response in England and Wales has continued to 
uphold this specific requirement, regarding it as central to obtaining conviction. It 
is this aspect of the offence that we address over the course of this article.  
The very enactment of a specific offence to tackle revenge pornography 
implies that current legal remedies are not fit for purpose as an adequate deterrent, 
yet it will be seen that both the new offence and most pre-existing laws are also 
reactive as opposed to preventative. Prior to the enactment of Section 33(1), legal 
action could be taken under a number of existing laws both criminal and civil. For 
example, criminal action under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 or civil 
action for a ‘breach of confidence’. Those pre-existing laws that serve a dual 
function, as both reactive and preventative, such as injunctions and the threat of a 
                                                        
34
 There are numerous sexually motivated offences that have benefited from the advancement of 
technology or indeed a product of them, including and not limited to voyeurism, child 
pornography, extreme pornography, stalking and harassment. 
35
 J F Quinn and C J Forsyth ‘Describing Sexual Behavior in the Era of the Internet: A Typology 
for Empirical Research’ (2005) 26 Deviant Behavior 191. 
36
 For example, the US state of Minnesota criminalises the act regardless of the intention under 
Laws of Minnesota, Chapter 126 S.F.No. 2713 (USA) 
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civil action for breach of confidence, are often limited to those victims who have 
the financial backing to bring such action. Further, neither of these laws cover all 
cases of revenge pornography and are limited in scope; harassment laws require a 
course of conduct
37
 and breach of confidence requires an obligation of confidence 
to exist between parties.
38
  Despite their shortcomings, these laws provided and 
still do provide an alternative basis for action in instances involving the disclosure 
of personal, private and sexual imagery without an individual’s consent. Whilst it 
is not the intention of this article to highlight every shortcoming of the existing 
laws, an overview is essential in order to understand the location of revenge 
pornography law within the context of both a broader roster of laws, which 
demonstrates that the new offence offers little additional benefit to victims. 
The primary means of prosecuting the disclosure of private sexual images 
prior to the new revenge pornography offence was through stalking and 
harassment offences. Stalking and harassment were made criminal offences with 
the enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
39
 Section 2 makes it 
an offence to cause ‘alarm or distress’ and put ‘people in fear of violence’. It is a 
requirement of the offence that a course of conduct is undertaken on two or more 
occasions resulting in a fear of violence or causing alarm or distress. Clearly the 
requirement for any course of conduct to be undertaken at least twice poses a 
problem in cases of revenge pornography. It would necessitate the disclosure of an 
                                                        
37 Under existing harassment law in the England & Wales a course of conduct must be undertaken 
on two or more occasions, which is unhelpful for victims of revenge pornography given that 
resulting  harms can flow from a single disclosure of such an image. 
38
 To establish a breach of confidence the information disclosed must have been imparted in such a 
way that imposed an obligation of confidence. This is not always the case in revenge pornography 
matters -  most notably where an image has been obtained from someone’s phone/icloud and 
disclosed without consent and then shared.  
39
 Amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 to include stalking. 
This article has been published in a revised form in Legal Studies, 
http://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2018.27. This version is published under a Creative 
Commons CC-BY-NC-ND. No commercial re-distribution or re-use allowed. 
Derivative works cannot be distributed. © copyright holder. 
 
 14 
image on two or more occasions before even engaging the law. However, the 
threat of disclosure could also be included under harassment laws, which, notably, 
would not be covered under the new offence.  As with other pre-existing laws, 
stalking and harassment offences are reactive. The same issue is present when 
considering the new Section 33 offence, which is perhaps inevitable given that in 
criminal law individuals must engage in a course of conduct.  However, a threat to 
disclose such imagery would at least be covered under the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1977, rendering the new offence even less effective given its 
focus is on the act and not the threat.  Most notably, the offence offers no 
additional practical redress to the victims of revenge pornography, such as the 
cover of ‘threats’, and serves nothing other than a retributive function for a 
specific offence.  
Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 makes it a criminal 
offence to send another an article which is ‘indecent or grossly offensive’, or 
which ‘conveys a threat, or which is false’. There is a requirement that the 
perpetrator intends to ‘cause distress or anxiety’ to the recipient. The offence 
covers the electronic communication of articles such as letters, writing of all 
descriptions, electronic communications, photographs and other images in a 
material form, tape recordings, films and video recordings; covering photographs 
in revenge pornography cases provided the terms of the offence are met. Connolly 
v DPP
40
 considered the terms ‘indecent or grossly offensive’, confirming that 
these were to be interpreted as ordinary English words.
41
 The problem with this 
provision is that the article – in the case of revenge pornography, the photo – 
                                                        
40
 [2007] 2 All ER 1012 
41
 [2007] 2 All ER 1012  
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needs to be offensive. It would require a finding that a private, sexual image, 
devoid of any illegal act, is indecent or grossly offensive. This presents a 
somewhat heteronormative outlook on sexual relationships and private sexual 
encounters as it would require that sexual acts or displays, considered outside 
existing standards of propriety, be found offensive. It is also arguable that the act 
of disclosure without consent is the offensive act, not the image itself. 
Additionally, in most cases it would not be the actual revenge pornography victim 
who receives the image but other parties. It would be the intended or actual 
recipient only who would have access to redress through this law.  
In addition to criminal actions, civil actions have also been undertaken, the 
success of which is largely dependent on the financial status of the perpetrator and 
the victim, in order to bring or defend a claim. It is worth noting at this point that 
the new offence fails to provide a course of action against hosts of websites or 
commercial entities that would have the financial net worth to make a civil action 
worthwhile. Laws concerning copyright
42
 and tortious wrongs such as ‘breach of 
confidence’43 are examples of civil actions applicable to revenge pornography 
cases. Copyright law in its most basic form serves as a right to prevent others 
from copying or reproducing the author’s work. It is the expression of an idea that 
is protected and not the idea itself. This is especially relevant for artistic works, 
such as graphic works and photos, with which we are concerned here. To what 
extent revenge pornography images themselves can actually be regarded as artistic 
is fairly unambiguous given that most works of art are afforded protection 
                                                        
42
 See Part 1 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) as amended, although also a 
criminal offence, see section 107 CDPA. 
43
 See Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302 
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irrespective of artistic quality. It is noted that some revenge pornography cases 
involve the victim’s own photos being disseminated without their consent. 
Therefore, the victim is the author in this case, and the distribution (the 
forwarding of the image without consent) infringes copyright. The one thing that 
sets copyright law apart from the new Section 33 offence is the ‘take down’ 
remedy offered to those whose copyright is infringed. In theory, this would 
provide victims with a way of serving notices on website hosts to take images 
down.  
Whilst copyright law may serve as a viable course of legal action in 
response to the disclosure of private sexual imagery,
44
 the restrictions placed on 
utilising this area of law are significant. Financially, a pursuit to challenge 
copyright infringement under the respective laws requires substantial financial 
backing, for which there is no state-sanctioned support (such as legal aid in 
criminal proceedings). Further, the action, as with all the laws discussed, fails to 
prevent unauthorised dissemination occurring. Given the nuanced nature of 
copyright law it is also unlikely that any potential perpetrator would be aware of it 
and in turn deterred by it, thus curbing the likelihood of any revenge pornography 
offence being committed. A further issue relates to the use of the internet in 
revenge pornography cases, as the complexity of any case would be largely 
determined by where the imagery was being hosted and by whom. This would 
determine which jurisdictions’ copyright laws are applicable to the infringement 
and subsequent infringements.  
                                                        
44
 A Levendowski ‘Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn’ (2013) 3 NY University J of Intel 
Prop & Ent L 422. 
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Action could be taken in tort prior to the enactment of Section 33, as set 
out in A v B Plc
45
 concerning a breach of confidence. This ruling applied in cases 
where confidential images are disseminated within or outside marriage. 
Importantly, under this action such an obligation of confidence extends to others 
who forward an image on. Under this law there is a duty of confidence ‘whenever 
a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonable 
to be regarded as confidential’ or in matters where it is clearly of a private 
nature.
46
 As with actions under copyright law, for victims to pursue an action in 
tort substantial financial backing as well as time is required. In revenge 
pornography cases time for lengthy litigation is not a luxury victims have, given 
that once an image is uploaded onto the internet or disseminated in any way it can 
continue to spread at speed.   
As will be demonstrated, the emergence of a specific offence to curb the 
‘disclosure of private sexual images’ does little to solve the current shortcomings 
of the pre-existing laws. It serves as an addition to the array of tools that attempt 
to tackle hostility and violence against women online but fails to attack the 
underpinning attitudes towards women’s privacy that exist beneath it. Whilst it is 
accepted that the law may have a symbolic value in outlining the distribution of 
private sexual images as explicitly criminal behaviour,
47
 the focus on ‘revenge’ 
narratives that underpinned the legislative process, and the likely operation of the 
law, does not offer the practical redress needed by victims of revenge 
pornography and other related offences, and instead reinforces the gendered 
                                                        
45
 [2002] Q.B. 195 
46
See above n 38 for an explanation of limitations in respect of an action for ‘breach of confidence’ 
in revenge pornography cases.  
47
 R Cotterrell The Sociology of Law’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1984). 
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power relations of heterosexual socio-cultural scripts. It is not argued here that all 
wrongs and the harms that flow from them should be criminalised, certainly the 
proper contours of criminalisation require limitations to prevent, for example, the 
criminalisation of trivial wrongs. In the case of revenge pornography the 
disclosure of private sexual images, contrary to Section 33, clearly result in harms 
that cause psychological or other damage to a person’s quality of life beyond that 
of mere trivialities, such as loss of employment and breach of privacy.
48
 Gillespie 
argues that a rationale for criminalising revenge pornography is to protect a 
person’s sexual autonomy and identity likening the disclosure of private sexual 
images to the absence of consent in sexual offences.
49
 It will be explained below 
how the new law purports to protect women from the very attitudes it threatens to 
reinforce; heteronormative assumptions about femininity and women’s sexuality 
long embedded in the criminal-legal construction of revenge. As we have seen, 
the primary distinguishing feature of the new offence is its focus on punishing the 
specific intent to cause distress through the circulation of private sexual 
photographs. However, the offence fails to take into consideration either how this 
intention is frequently gendered in the context of intimate relationships, or the 
harms it may cause beyond distress.  
 
A Dish Best Served Cold: Sexual Revenge and the Law 
                                                        
48
 See A P Simester and A von Hirsch Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Hart Publishing, 2011)  
49
 Gillespie, above n 1. 
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Discourses of revenge found in cases involving crimes of passion, where men 
have been excused for killing their adulterous wives,
50
 and how the criminal law 
has historically treated gendered revenge motives, assist us firstly in analysing to 
what extent socio-cultural revenge scripts underpin the new offence, and 
secondly in identifying how the problem of victim-blaming is likely to arise in 
order to establish mens rea. In the context of spousal homicide, a defendant’s 
violent actions have been constructed as excusatory and justificatory
51
 under 
partial defences that reduced a charge of murder to manslaughter. Horder notes 
that the historical function of the partial defence of provocation was justificatory 
‘because it requires the defendants to explain their conduct, in part, by reference 
to the “moral warrant” that they believed the gravity of the provocation gave 
them for retaliating so violently in anger’.52 In terms of the excusatory element, 
the defence does not operate to ‘correct’ the defendant’s wrongful conduct; 
instead it sheds ‘favourable moral light on what D did through a focus on the 
reasons that D committed that wrongdoing.’ 53  The defence’s focus on the 
victim’s actions in such cases, and what she might have done to provoke the 
defendant, is often pivotal to the verdict. Whilst revenge is not an explicit 
component of the Section 33 offence, it is the way in which it is likely to operate 
in the courts that demands comparison with provocation.  
The old law of provocation was set out in Section 3 of the Homicide Act 
1957, reducing a charge of murder to manslaughter and in doing so removing 
                                                        
50
 J Horder and K Fitz-Gibbon ‘When sexual infidelity triggers murder: examining the homicide 
law reform on judicial attitudes in sentencing’ (2015) 74 Camb L J 307. 
51
 J Dressler ‘Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?’ (1988) 51 Mod Law Rev 467. 
52
 J Horder Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p 112. 
53
 J Horder Excusing Crime  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at p 8-9 
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the mandatory life sentence associated with murder.
54
 In cases where the 
provocation defence was used to excuse the defendant’s actions in ‘crimes of 
passion’55 it hinged on whether the victim’s actions provoked the defendant to 
lose his or her self-control. Cases concerning the operation of the provocation 
plea evidence the way in which male sexual jealousy is regarded in criminal-
legal discourse as another ‘natural’ evolutionary supplement: a question of ‘male 
sexual proprietariness’. 56  In the case of R v Suratan, R v Humes and R v 
Wilkinson (Attorney General’s Reference No. 74, No. 95 and No. 118 of 2002),57 
the appeal concerned the sentences imposed for manslaughter in a matrimonial 
or domestic setting, where a plea of provocation had been accepted, which were 
regarded as overly ‘lenient’ and therefore failed to ‘reflect the seriousness of the 
offences’.58 Sentences of between 2 and 7 years had been imposed upon the 
three men for what Howe describes as an ‘annihilation of their female 
partners’.59 Such lenient sentences, handed down in instances where men kill 
women suspected of adultery, have served as evidence that the courts regard the 
                                                        
54 The requirements of the defence in Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 were as follows:  
‘Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the judge can find that the person 
charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his 
self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he 
did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take 
into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would 
have on a reasonable man.’ 
55
 Howe, above n 10.  
56
 M I Wilson and M Daly ‘Male Sexual Proprietariness and Violence Against Wives’ (1996) 5 
Current Directions in Psych Sci 2. 
57
 [2002] EWCA 2982 
58
 [2002] EWCA 2982 at [6] 
59
 A Howe ‘Provocation in crisis – Law’s Passion at the Crossroads? New Directions for Feminist 
Strategists’ (2004) 21 Aus Feminist L J 1 
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men as justifiably provoked.
60
 The law of provocation primarily focused on the 
behaviour of the victim and what they did to cause the behaviour of the defendant.  
It is accepted that revenge in relation to Section 33 and the partial defences 
of provocation and loss of control function in different ways. In the case of 
Section 33, the defendant’s ‘intention to cause distress’ is central to establishing 
the offence itself in the courts, whereas revenge in the defence of provocation  
operates to reduce liability in cases of murder. However, the way revenge is 
operationalized in practice, in both offences, risks individualising violence against 
women, reimagining that violence as an act of revenge with justificatory or 
excusatory qualities that limit wrongfulness. In Section 33 the focus is  on the 
motivations of the perpetrator instead of the impact on the victim and, like 
partial defences to homicide, its operation is also likely to be scaffolded around 
male proprietariness. It has the potential to bring to the table a discussion or at 
least, a consideration, of what the victim did to deserve this. Ultimately, both 
homicide and revenge pornography offences permit attempts to excuse or justify 
harmful behaviour by constructing it as anything but violence against women. 
The search for a rationale as to why the avenger might have sought to disclose 
private sexual images to cause distress allows for the possibility that victims risk 
being seen ultimately as still at fault: she got what she deserved.  
 As noted in the opening section of this article, revenge pornography has 
been constructed in popular discourse and in practice as a kind of contemporary 
‘crime of passion’ through the narrative of the jilted sexual partner. It is 
                                                        
60
 S Edwards ‘Provoking Her Own Demise: From Common Assault to Homicide’, in J Hanmer 
and M Maynard (eds) Women, Violence and Social Control (London: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 
1987). 
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specifically a question of ‘passion’ that appears to govern the mens rea and thus 
the threshold for culpability in Section 33(1)(b). As Ledward and Agate have 
noted, in many Section 33 cases that have come before the courts to date 
evidence of intent is fairly obvious,
61
 but the necessity of the provision of 
evidence risks necessitating exploration of a rationale for sharing the image and 
thus examination of the victim’s behaviour. Indeed, this may be entirely 
necessary for a successful prosecution. As the question of intent turns on malice 
rather than sexual gratification, and the Section 33 offence is not a sexual 
offence, the usual protections proffered to victims of sexual violence do not 
currently apply and serve only to exacerbate the potential problem of double 
victimisation.
62
 As we will demonstrate, media reports of these cases rarely shirk 
on the circumstantial details that led the perpetrator to share the image. The very 
fact that these details are available for press coverage suggests that precipitating 
factors are already being cross-examined in court. In addition, figures from the 
Crown Prosecution Service 2015-16 – with around 61% of reported cases 
resulting in no further action – suggest that either there is insufficient evidence 
of specific intent, or that the victim has withdrawn support for action
63
. We 
surmise that one factor that might give rise to the latter is the problem of 
potential victim blaming, and the need for cross examination of precipitating 
factors that Section 33(1)(b) requires to prove intent.  
                                                        
61
 J Ledward and J Agate ‘“Revenge Porn” and Section 33: The Story so Far’ (2017) 28 Ent L Rev 
41. 
62
 For a comparative study of how double victimisation operates in cases of rape, see K Soothill 
and S Walby ‘Prosecuting the victim? A Study of the Reporting of Barristers’ Comments in Rape 
Cases’ (1993) 32 Howard J of C J 12. 
63
M Ellis ‘Anonymity in Revenge Pornography Cases' Lexology 12 September 2016, available at 
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As Jacoby suggests, there are ‘written and unwritten laws governing 
sexual relationships, which, because of their emotional nature, are generally 
treated as questions of passion rather than power’. 64  Thus, it is perhaps no 
surprise that the operation of the law risks focusing on the ‘passions’ that 
stimulate a desire to cause distress. This significantly limits the circumstances in 
which a case is likely to come to trial to those involving clear evidence of 
intent,
65
 but more crucially also represents an attempt to transpose the rules of 
civility that have historically governed romantic relationships, both written and 
unwritten, to the digital age. This leads Jacoby to the rather controversial 
question: ‘ought people who are bound together … by emotionally binding ties 
of intimacy, be allowed to take revenge on each other in ways that would 
ordinarily be forbidden by law?’ 66  Closer inspection of how revenge in the 
context of intimate relationships has been constructed in criminal-legal 
discourse in recent years not only aids our understanding of the legal context for 
the new offence, but provides clues as to why discussion within the legislative 
process and media reporting became dependent on retrogressive constructions of 
(predominantly) heterosexual relationships. As we will see, references to love, 
honour and injury pervade these cases, and – although there have been cases 
reported of female revenge porn perpetrators – demonstrate the particularly 
gendered qualities that haunt legal constructions of revenge.  
An important development in the recent history of punishing crimes of 
passion is the supposed distinction between a ‘loss of control’ and revenge in 
                                                        
64
 S Jacoby Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge (London: Harper & Row 1983) 184. 
65
 McGlynn and Rackley, above n 2.  
66
 Jacoby, above n 65, at 223. 
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partial defences to murder, outlined briefly in the previous section. Section 54(4) 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 makes clear that: ‘Subsection (1) does not 
apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a considered desire for 
revenge.’67 What distinguishes a momentary loss of control and revenge in law 
is a sense that the injury is inflicted in a considered manner, aiming to ‘right’ a 
perceived ‘wrong’. Nevertheless, in the case of R v Clinton, Parker and Evans,68 
this distinction appeared particularly flimsy, and the judgment hinged on the 
meaning of revenge. In each case brought to the attention of the appellate courts, 
a jilted husband killed his ex-wife after she had admitted to him that she had 
been having a relationship with another man. Despite the move to exclude 
sexual infidelity as a qualifying trigger in the partial defence of loss of control, 
the perpetrator may be treated sympathetically in the case of romantic 
relationships where it is assumed that the ‘passion’ governing violence in 
response to infidelity, sexual jealousy and ‘crushed dreams’, provided it is used 
to contextualise ‘a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing said or done’69, 
provides the defendant with a justifiable sense of being wronged and excuse to 
use violence. . As Lord Judge averred in his ruling in Clinton: ‘Relationship 
breakdown is always fraught with tension and difficulty, with the possibility of 
misunderstanding and the potential for apparently irrational fury’.70  
That a ‘special case’ is made for revenge motivations in the breakdown 
of a romantic relationship in this judgment is revealing, and the implications of 
Clinton for cases involving spousal homicide have been the subject of multiple 
                                                        
67
 Section 54(4) Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
68
 Clinton, Parker and Evans, above n 11. 
69
 Section 55(6)(b) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
70
 Clinton, Parker and Evans, above n 11 at [16]. 
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criticisms.
71
 For our purposes, however, that vengeful motivations in the context 
of romantic relationships are treated as  excusatory also has symbolic 
significance, and is potentially catastrophic for victims of revenge pornography. 
As Lord Judge goes on to argue in Clinton:  
Experience over many generations has shown that, however it may 
become apparent, when it does, sexual infidelity has the potential 
to … produce a completely unpredictable, and sometimes violent 
response … [which] often stems from a sense of betrayal and 
heartbreak, and crushed dreams.
72
 
This kind of language, used to describe the circumstances in which Section 
54(4) does not apply, betrays judicial sentiments towards the anticipated gender 
roles taken in romantic relationships, and the sense that when ‘passion’ clouds 
judgement, it may be taken as an excusatory factor. This view of revenge – and 
perhaps the ‘experience over generations’ the judges refer to – also recalls the 
long history of possessive erotic love, in which the old ‘male dream of 
symmetry’,73 with man as the possessor and woman as exclusively possessed 
becomes central to the gendered constitution of revenge; where one’s 
‘hotbloodedness’ is considered a necessary precursor to the defence of erotic 
love, and a guard over one’s manliness and virility.  As Howe puts it, Clinton 
reveals that the ‘profoundly sexed early modern fiction of his possessory right 
over her [which] can be traced through centuries of case law still finds a place in 
                                                        
71
 See, for example, Horder and Fitzgibbons, above n 50; Howe, above n 10; K J Kesselring ‘No 
Greater Provocation? Adultery and the Mitigation of Murder in English Law’ (2015) 34 Law & 
Hist Rev 199. 
72
 Clinton, Parker and Evans, above n 11, at [16]. 
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 N Naffine ‘Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape’ (1994) 57 Mod L Rev 10. 
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late modern and putatively egalitarian democracies’.74 While not all Section 33 
cases involve suspected infidelity, as we will see, the cases reported in the press to 
date invariably do rest on sexual jealousy. Further, however, the analogy with 
Clinton and other cases of intimate partner homicide ultimately demonstrate the 
problem at the heart of the offence. While the specific intent requirement allows 
for the possibility that intent to cause distress might be manifested in a number 
of ways, it nevertheless implies that the victim must have done something that 
provoked the defendant to develop such an intent. We therefore retain a certain 
cynicism about the operation of the offence. Where the circumstances in which 
the perpetrator circulates an image are revealed, and while the victim can be 
cross-examined to provide a backstory that offers a rationale for distributing the 
image to cause distress, juror sentiments towards the ‘rules’ of romantic 
relationships may well govern trial outcomes.  
 
 
Wild Justice: Tracing Revenge in Media, Parliamentary and Policy 
Narratives on Revenge Pornography 
Motivations for revenge pornography have been central to media coverage of the 
offence. The importance of the media coverage of revenge pornography cannot be 
understated given that the term revenge pornography itself is media generated.
75
 
Despite our concerns raised previously – that the offence focuses primarily on the 
motivation behind the act – the term ‘revenge pornography’ dominates headlines 
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 A Howe ‘Enduring Fictions of Possession’ (2012) 21 Griff L Rev 772 at 778. 
75
 A Powell and N Henry Sexual Violence in the Digital Age (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 
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of stories about those victimised. For example, in April 2016 the Plymouth Herald 
published a story in which Shaun Kinsman posted 35 sexual images of his ex-
partner online following their breakup in ‘an act of revenge pornography.’ 76 
Kinsman declared that he posted the images in ‘revenge’ when he was rejected by 
the victim and ‘felt hurt’. This story reflects the typical revenge narrative of non-
consensual image distribution following a breakup outlined in the introduction. 
However, the article also provides details of the victim’s supposed infidelity to the 
perpetrator, noting that the image was posted on Facebook ‘giving the location of 
the town where she lived, her age and claims that she had cheated on him with her 
ex’.77 By providing information about the victim’s supposed infidelity, the readers 
of the news become the judges of whether the assailant should be excused for 
distributing the private intimate image without her consent. The questions posed 
to these moral arbiters concern whether the women’s act of infidelity justifies or 
excuses the act of uploading the images, or whether the woman’s rejection of 
Kinsman equates to an act worthy of revenge.  
In the media reporting of Kinsman’s case, the ways in which infidelity is 
presented as central to the story are two-fold. On the one hand, it reifies violence 
against women as a justifiable act of revenge; on the other, by focusing on what 
the victim did to provoke such treatment, it preserves the status of masculinity as a 
means of controlling or punishing women who dare to betray or leave their 
partners. In turn, this reproduces the myth of male proprietariness over the 
                                                        
76
 J Lewis ‘Cornish Man Posted 35 Revenge Porn Pictures Online after Breaking up with 
Girlfriend’ Plymouth Herald 24 April 2016, available at 
http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/cornish-man-posted-35-revenge-porn-pictures/story-29166938-
detail/story.html (accessed 22 December 2016). 
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endings of romantic relationships, where men and only men can instigate 
separation. It is noted that Kinsman ‘felt hurt’ and revenge pornography was his 
means of getting ‘one up on her’ because of her supposed infidelity.78 Violence 
against women is repackaged as a story of infidelity, hurt and revenge. Similarly, 
in the case of Paul Deacon,
79
 the perpetrator undertook a course of violence 
against his ex-partner, yet the media narrative again references her alleged 
infidelity, noting how Deacon, during a confrontation at the victim’s house, 
‘[accused] her of seeing someone else’,80 which essentially provides the same 
infidelity revenge context as seen in the case of Kinsman.  
While media reporting of revenge pornography cases tends ultimately to 
condemn the practice, it is perhaps unsurprising that journalists cannot help but 
linger on precipitating factors for the offence, namely the behaviour of the victim, 
which suggests that the sexual history of victims is indeed being scrutinised in the 
courts. However, as we will demonstrate, this is not simply a problem of 
sensationalist reporting, since this factor is endemic to the debates surrounding 
criminalisation, and even CPS and sentencing guidance. In the Parliamentary 
debates about revenge pornography that led to the creation of the offence, the 
purpose it should serve and what it specifically aims to criminalise proved 
difficult to define, but it was at this stage that revenge motivations took centre-
stage as the primary target of the new offence. In the first Commons debate in 
                                                        
78
 Ibid. 
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 Paul Deacon was jailed for six months for attacking his ex-wife and then posting a topless photo 
of her on Facebook.  
80
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June 2014, Maria Miller MP, who raised the issue on behalf of a constituent who 
had been victimised, drew on the narrative of victims as  
ordinary women who have been in loving relationships .. [W]hen that 
relationship goes wrong, their partner’s revenge is to post on the 
internet intimate pictures taken over the course of that relationship as 
well as distributing them to employers, families and friends.
81
 
Miller was drawing on the specific experiences of her own constituent as a case 
study in this instance, and it should be noted that she was careful to avoid the use 
of any language which might responsibilise the victim, but initiating the debate by 
providing this specific story of revenge nevertheless shapes the terms of it, 
focusing the target for legislation around this quite specific narrative of romantic 
vengeance.  
Miller went on to describe the internet as a kind of ‘wild west’, implying 
that despite the fact that the days of treating it as such are ‘long gone and that 
freedom online is no longer unconditional’, there is a sense that justice in this 
space is subject to the same pre-modern blood feuds that were curbed by civilised 
state-sanctioned retributive justice. Miller here could almost be drawing directly 
on Francis Bacon’s famous essay, Of Revenge, from 1625, which describes 
revenge as a ‘kind of wild justice, which the more man’s nature runs to the more 
ought law to weed it out.’82  The implication is that the internet, as Balkin alludes, 
is now a virtual environment ‘which will reshape legal concepts like jurisdiction 
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and ownership’. 83  In cyberspace, extra-legal ‘wild justice’ in the context of 
intimate relationships might be described as a new ‘frontier’ for legislators to 
colonise and overpower. The internet is constructed in these debates as a new and 
threatening terrain, in which blood revenge runs rampant and must be ‘weeded 
out’ with new legislative constraints. 
When the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2015 eventually reached the 
House of Lords, the question of the purpose of the offence was again raised, and 
in particular whether it would constitute a sexual offence. The original 
Amendment tabled suggested that an offence would only be committed if the 
publisher intended that someone ‘looking at the image did so for the purpose of 
obtaining sexual gratification’.84  Baroness Grender also chose to focus in her 
comments on the motive to ‘sexually humiliate’ in order to demonstrate that the 
libidinous properties of revenge must be at the forefront of the offence. Baroness 
Kennedy, however, urged the Lords to take greater care over the drafting: 
It is important to draft widely without specifying the nature of the 
motivation. That is because it is always difficult to pin down 
motivation … It is really an issue about consent: has a person 
consented to the disclosure of intimate photographs? It is not an issue 
of speculating what the motivations might be.
85
  
Nevertheless, Baroness Kennedy’s plea for a refocus on consent met with little 
response. Baroness Morris returned almost immediately to the question of motive 
in her reply to Baroness Kennedy, and seemed to ignore the consequences of 
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harm, saying: ‘[r]evenge is a horrible and destructive motive generally’. But 
perhaps the most revealing statement in this debate came from Baroness Barker, 
who again put the onus on motivation to criminalise: 
Our amendment tries to focus not on the definition of what is 
pornographic but on the act of revenge. That is why, in our 
amendment, we have concentrated on the initial posting of an image 
rather than the reproduction or the recommunication of it, because the 
act of revenge happens in the initial posting.
86
 
While this amendment was, in the end, withdrawn, that the terms of the debate 
remained focused on the law’s capacity to deter and suppress the motivation to 
seek revenge in the perpetrator is significant. This stymied from the very first the 
potential of the offence to capture a broader range of technology-facilitated sexual 
violence and the harms they may cause.  
 Since the law came into force, considerable media attention has been paid 
to the new offence, but it has not escaped critique. In 2016, scarcely a year after 
the law came into force, the Liberal Democrats tabled a series of amendments, 
suggesting that a low number of convictions might be remedied by reforming the 
law to mirror Scotland’s, in which the specific intent requirement in Section 
33(1)(b) is not present, and instead proof of mere recklessness as to causing ‘fear, 
alarm or distress’ will suffice. While we are cautious of the possibility that this 
amendment could lead to a slippage between ‘sexting’ and revenge pornography, 
and would not recommend that the Scottish model is followed,
87
 the amendment 
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does at least consider a wider range of possible harms to victims. In addition, the 
possibility of granting anonymity to victims was considered in Parliament. 
However, the amendments were not moved, and in the House of Lords, Baroness 
Williams reiterated the importance of the offence being ‘undiluted’ from its 
original aim of punishing revenge: 
This malicious intent—the revenge element of revenge porn, so to 
speak—is a key feature of the offence and we believe it would be wrong 
to dilute this by applying the offence to conduct that is the result of 
recklessness rather than a deliberately malicious act.
88
 
As we see, in these more recent debates there is little discussion of countering the 
surface-scratching nature of the legal response to disclosure of private sexual 
images, and although it is reassuring to see a wider range of possible harms 
victims may experience signposted, the response fails to delve much beyond 
specific intent.  
Guidance on prosecution and sentencing has also remained focused on this 
aspect of the offence. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) issued guidelines to 
prosecutors reiterating at least one of the purposes of the disclosure of private 
sexual imagery must be to cause ‘humiliation or embarrassment’89 to the victim to 
meet the threshold for prosecution. Indeed, the guidance document itself is 
specifically titled ‘Revenge Pornography’. This language fails to deal adequately 
with the social and economic harms associated with revenge pornography that go 
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beyond humiliation or embarrassment, and instead reduces the harm to merely an 
emotional or psychological response. Certainly, McGlynn, Rackley and Houghton 
have asserted that revenge pornography should form part of a continuum of 
‘image-based sexual abuse’90 in which a connection is laid bare between revenge 
pornography and other forms of sexual violence, which they argue share both 
characteristics and consequences.  
The reductive language used in this guidance to describe the associated 
harms of Section 33 offences distinguishes the way the offence is understood and 
consequently, responded to.  For example, the limited remedies available to 
victims of disclosure of private sexual images fail to acknowledge the range of 
harms suffered by victims, such as breach of privacy, loss of employment and 
harassment. Nowhere in the CPS guidance are any of these harms mentioned. As 
Mathen suggests, refocusing on the link between revenge and distress has a 
certain social currency, in that it ‘evokes some of what society finds especially 
horrifying about such activity’,91 and therefore possesses an expressive function, 
but of course, this link may not be consistent in all cases. Yet Vora notes that 
underlying legal frameworks concerning disclosure of private sexual images also 
exists a ‘shadow taxonomy’92 that minimises or trivializes the amount and types 
of harms experienced by victims, such as the ‘violation of fundamental rights to 
sexual autonomy, integrity and sexual expression’ together with ‘physical and 
mental illness’.93  The result of this ‘shadow taxonomy’ is to ‘deny victims an 
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effective remedy’.94 By failing to acknowledge the range of harms associated with 
disclosure of private sexual images, ‘effective’ remedies such as takedown orders 
or compensation for loss of employment are absent from discussion. Whilst 
Vora’s work centres on the judicial language used in the courts, the same can be 
said for the language used in legal and policy debates elsewhere, and indeed, this 
is what we argue here – that the trivialisation or even disregard for the broader 
harms associated with revenge pornography go little way to improving current 
legal remedies.   
More recently, the Sentencing Council initiated a consultation process in 
England and Wales over a set of draft guidelines for use in Section 33 cases. The 
proposed guidelines argue for a two-step process, whereby sentencing range is 
determined first on culpability factors, and secondly on the level of harm caused. 
Step one appears to address the question that there may be a spectrum of 
motivations. It draws on the distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold-blooded’ revenge 
to determine the level of culpability, differentiating between offences which are 
essentially ‘pre-meditated’, where there is a degree of ‘significant planning and/or 
[resembles a] sophisticated offence’ (cold-blooded), and offences where there is 
‘little or no planning’ (hot-blooded). Whilst the importance of reflecting 
comparative blameworthiness in sentencing is acknowledged there is a risk here 
that disclosure of private sexual images might more easily be excused and/or 
justified, at least partially, if significant evidence is found that revenge was borne 
out of sudden and fleeting bouts of passion/fury. In addition, it is our contention 
that it is much more likely that cases in which culpability falls into Category C – 
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where there is neither significant planning nor ‘an intention to cause maximum 
distress’ (as signposted in Category A) – would likely not be prosecuted at all due 
to insufficient evidence of specific intent 
Step two of the draft guidelines highlight that sentencing should also 
consider the level of harm experienced by the victim. Whilst the move away 
from an exclusive focus on motivations is welcome, and whilst the Council does 
make an effort to address some of the harms suffered by victims, they are 
nevertheless extremely limited as a result of the centrality of the distress element 
to the offence. McGlynn et al have urged that revenge pornography be 
understood alongside other forms of sexual abuse in order that the harms it 
induces be better acknowledged and understood.
95
 When comparing the 
proposed sentencing guidelines to the sentencing guidelines for sexual offences, 
many of the harms associated with the latter are relevant here, such as ‘severe 
psychological or physical harm,’ ‘additional degradation/humiliation’ and 
‘violence or threats of violence’. 96 However, the Section 33 guidelines barely 
touch on these. Category 1 – the highest level of harm – is limited to when there 
is ‘very serious distress caused to the victim’, harm where the ‘victim is 
particularly vulnerable’ and where the ‘offence has considerable practical impact 
on the victim.’97  
There is also a considerable slippage between the terms ‘distress’ and 
‘harm’ that runs throughout the guidelines, and in places the terms are used 
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interchangeably. While step two does take into account the fact that the harms of 
revenge porn are not limited to distress, step one restricts the intent 
encompassed under high culpability to conduct intended to cause distress. As the 
psychological literature reveals, the object of revenge pursuits is not always 
primarily to cause distress; indeed, this may well be a secondary or oblique 
intent. Section 33(8) of the Act states that:  
a person charged with an offence under this section is not to be taken 
to have distributed a photograph or film with the intention of causing 
distress merely because that was a natural and probable consequence 
of the disclosure. 
While possibly present to prevent the mens rea of the offence being diluted to 
mere recklessness, circumstances in which the offender does indeed intend 
principally to cause the victim harm – such as forwarding a private sexual image 
to her boss, with the intent of having her dismissed – either may not be caught 
by the offence or, at sentencing, will still not be regarded as possessing a high 
degree of culpability, since distress is not the direct intent.  However, Gillespie, 
whilst noting the uncertainty of the wording within the section, suggests that it is 
more likely to relate to ‘legitimate disclosures’ that, whilst could result in 
‘distress’ should not be captured by the act. 98 A third question of concern 
regarding step 2 is how ‘distress’ might be measured for sentencing purposes. 
What evidence would need to be presented, and by whom? And is it realistic to 
presume that judges will agree that the level of harm constitutes Category 1 
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(‘serious types of harm’), when the defendant is considered to have a low degree 
of culpability? 
The effect of public discourse and legislative focus operates to minimise 
the gendered nature of the harms that result from revenge pornography, and the 
terminology used throughout the CPS guidelines, draft sentencing guidelines 
and parliamentary debates signals a failure to ‘appreciate the scale of the 
problem’.99  Whilst the positives in not being overly prescriptive in outlining a 
number of specific harms or scenarios are acknowledged (therefore not overly 
restrictive), the guidelines also assume that those using them will be able to 
consider and understand the nature and impact of the harms caused to victims 
and be able to adequately judge the level of harm and, indeed, ‘distress’. It is 
notable that the example scenario provided in the guidelines (Case Study C)
100
 is 
precisely the paradigmatic revenge pornography case we outlined in the 
introduction. Thus, we are left with a sense that the facts of a case are likely to 
be ‘measured up’ against this paradigmatic scenario. With that said, if being 
overly prescriptive was really an issue surely this would be equally true in the 
sentencing guidelines for rape. Ultimately, both the Section 33 offence and the 
sentencing guidelines remain shackled primarily to punishing revenge 
motivations rather than acknowledging and remedying harms caused to victims. 
Until this is appreciated in prosecution and sentencing policy, and the offence 
itself is reformed to combat this, there will be limited success in resolving the 
deep-seated cultural issues associated with violence against women that 
underpin disclosure of private sexual images.   
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Conclusion 
The House of Lords Communication Committee, which reports on social media 
offences, recommended that disclosure of private sexual images was already well-
covered by existing ‘private laws’ 101  previously discussed within this article. 
Therefore, the only justification for the new offence is that it allows a victim to 
take retributive action and report, with the express goal of punishing for 
wrongdoing. Criminal justice intervention does not resolve any of the harms 
suffered by victims, given that the intervention provides no take-down solution of 
images automatically proffered in response to a successful prosecution, nor the 
ability to seek compensatory measures for, as an example, employment lost as a 
result of reputational damage. Practically, these are measures that would provide 
some redress to the victim of revenge pornography. The new offence 
predominantly focuses on the motivation behind the offence rather than the harm 
it causes the victim. The pursuit of revenge, it seems, is still as ripe a target for 
criminal-legal suppression now via Section 33, as it was then for crimes of 
passion. While the letter of the law makes no reference to revenge, for Section 
33(b) to be proven it is likely to be difficult for a prosecution to avoid reference to 
the victim’s actions. This exposes the problem at the heart of the offence. Despite 
its attempts to explicitly avoid ‘revenge pornography’, the specific intent 
requirement invites discussion of revenge motivations and precipitating factors for 
them in by the back door. We agree, however, with Gillespie that a strict liability 
offence is going too far, and thus, one further recommendation would be the 
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removal of the specific intent requirement and instead a reliance on Section 8 
Criminal Justice Act 1967, which refers to intent being determined 'by reference 
to all the evidence'.
102
 However, one caveat we would suggest would be that such 
evidence should not include the victim’s sexual history and instead redirect focus 
on the effects of the disclosure on the victim (who should be permitted 
anonymity). Further, whilst there may be no place for a categorical approach in a 
reformed offence in terms of 'harms', perhaps the sentencing guidelines, had more 
care been taken, could offer greater acknowledgement of the harms as guidance 
and more solutions to the real harms associated with Section 33 offences, and 
address the same (take down orders, anonymity, financial redress to the victim 
(loss of job), restriction of victims sexual history). There are currently no reported 
cases under Section 33 in England and Wales. Thus, it is difficult to tell to what 
extent the cross-examination of the victim’s behaviour impact on the sentence 
imposed or how the question of revenge is discussed in court. With this said, 
revenge dominates legal, policy and media discourse on revenge pornography 
that operates to redirect debate and legislative responses away from recognised 
acts of violence against women and towards a condemnation of female 
sexuality.  
It is particularly disappointing to see that the question of anonymity was 
sidestepped in discussion of reform of the law, and we echo McGlynn and 
Rackley
103
 in recommending that this should be a primary consideration for 
legislators. In addition, very recently, the Ministry of Justice rejected calls to ban 
cross-examining victims on their sexual history in cases of rape, even if only in 
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exceptional circumstances.
104
 We would recommend that CPS guidance on 
Section 33 should be amended to not only remove any mention of ‘revenge 
pornography’, but in addition, should make clear that defence lawyers should not 
ordinarily cross-examine victims or, indeed, the perpetrator about their sexual 
history. While we believe that a high threshold for proving intention should be 
maintained, and do not recommend following the Scottish model, explicitly ruling 
it out would go some way to reducing secondary victimisation, and redirect the 
jury’s attention squarely on the perpetrator’s actions. 
The paradigmatic narrative of revenge pornography looms large over the 
policy, legal and tabloid reporting of the offence, and as we have shown, relies on 
providing context for the act of revenge that either aims to mitigate the harm the 
victim suffered, or implicitly justify the ‘need’ for revenge as a recourse to 
infidelity or perceived wrongdoing on the part of the victim. However, the wider 
question this article has posed is whether revenge pornography, and the desire to 
criminalise it, would exist as a cultural phenomenon were women’s sexual agency 
not considered a provocation deserving of revenge, or the basis for their 
condemnation. Merely criminalising intention to cause distress in revenge 
pornography as though it is a ‘natural’ and universal urge to be suppressed, just as 
was the case in ‘crimes of passion’, does little to overturn these heavily gendered 
dynamics and stereotypes, and instead reinforces and repeats age-old 
heteropatriarchal scripts that demand the sexual deviations of women, ultimately, 
cannot go unpunished. 
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